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The Vulnerable State and Technical Fixes: An Analysis of
Ofcial Climate Change Discourses in Nepal

Pearly Wong

I conduct discourse analysis of seven selected
ofcial climate change policies and documents
of Nepal. In the frst part of my analysis, I draw
from international climate justice discourses
to analyze how policy makers construct Nepal’s
position in the global arena, in relation to the
issue of climate change. In the second part, I
draw from political ecology and anthropological
understandings of ‘vulnerability’ and
‘adaptation’ to analyze how policy makers
construct those terms in the context of Nepal.
The result shows that Nepal has adhered to
the ‘vulnerability’ and ‘transition’ discourses,
which serve as important tools to advocate
for fnancial support from the international
climate change regime. Driven primarily by
international processes and guidelines, the
climate change policies and documents in
Nepal project a heavily technocratic approach
with litle socio-cultural considerations.
Vulnerability is understood as a static property
and assessed based on sectors and geographic
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areas, while adaptation is understood as series
of actions to be implemented. Overall, the
policies are at risk of perpetuating the existing
systemic ills, as well as impeding imaginaries to
pursue more radical socio-political and cultural
change as efective adaptation measures.
Keywords: climate change, Nepal, discourse, vulnerability,
adaptation.

Introduction
“Nepal has negligible contribution on global greenhouse
gas emissions but impacts of climate change are tremendous, long-lasting and multi-fold both at uplands and
lowlands. Hence, climate change adaptation is our national
priority.” (Government of Nepal (GoN) 2010b: i)
Nepal is a predominantly agrarian, socially stratified
society with fragile mountain ecosystems in the Himalaya.
The opening quote is by Madhav Kumar Nepal, the Prime
Minister of Nepal from 2009 to 2011, in the National Adaptation Program of Action to Climate Change (NAPA), represents
the country as ‘highly vulnerable’ to climate change and
thus requires international support to cope with climate
change. For the past decade, Nepal has been actively
producing policy documents related to climate change.
For instance, in a brief submitted to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the
country listed seventeen major climate change related
policies and instruments.1
A post-structuralist perspective understands discourses
as integral with power, which act to constrain people’s
life choices. Discourses in official national-level policies
especially could have real impacts in shaping the planning
and implementation of future governance and actions.
In this paper, I conduct a discourse analysis of selected
official climate change policies and documents of Nepal.
Particularly, I look at how policy makers construct Nepal’s position in the global arena in relation to the issue of
climate change, to better understand policy making in the
context of international climate negotiation. I also look at
how policy makers construct ‘vulnerability’ and ‘adaptation’ in the context of Nepal. These two terms are especially important, as the definition of ‘vulnerability’ determines
who are being included or excluded in climate change
adaptation efforts. Similarly, written ‘adaptation’ measures
could result in certain pathways to be pursued over others
in face of climate change. Critical climate change discourse
analysis thus could help illuminate two aspects: (1) whether current adaptation measures potentially perpetuate
the dominant system and thus worsen vulnerabilities of
populations in the long run and (2) whether the existing
discourses impedes imaginaries to pursue more radical but
necessary socio-political and cultural change as effective
adaptation measures.
I argue that Nepal’s positioning in the international arena
affects its policy discourses. In the policy makers’ attempt
to draw climate change funding support through the positioning of Nepal as a vulnerable country, they have prioritized international guidelines and frameworks, resulting in
the dominance of depoliticized, technical understandings

and fixes. These discourses neither adequately address the
stratified, heterogenous nature of the Nepali society, nor
sufficiently consider the Nepali people as active agents
experiencing challenges from multiple socio-political and
cultural processes. Instead, they potentially perpetuate
aid and policy dependence of Nepal, and the status quo
approach to development as economic and technological
growth.
Methods and Framework
My analysis comprises two parts. First, I explore how
the Nepali state is being characterized and positioned in
selected climate change documents. This helps to provide some clues on the contexts in which these policies
are made. Audet (2013) has identified three discourses in
international climate change negotiations. I classify the
discourses used by Nepal in reference to these three discourses: (1) the responsibility discourse which emphasizes
responsibility for climate change and for reducing emissions first, (2) the transition discourse, led by the European
Union, which considers ‘transition to a low-carbon economy’ as the means to mitigate climate change and to reduce
climate injustice, and (3) the vulnerability discourse which
focuses on uneven consequences of climate change on
different countries and regions, which serves as basis for
demanding compensation and funding (Audet 2013). I will
also examine whether the Nepali discourses are affected
by non-state actors in the international arena, such as
the global climate justice movements. These movements
differ from the three discourses, primarily in their explicit
appeal to address the issue of equity, as well as transforming the status quo, such as by “keeping fossil fuels in the
ground” (Bond 2012: 205).
Second, I critically analyze what constitutes ‘vulnerability’
and ‘adaptation’ in those same documents. I draw from the
political ecology approach to ‘vulnerability’ and anthropological approach to ‘adaptation’ in doing this. These two
approaches are critical responses to the usual apolitical
and technical policy process assumed in the international
efforts in integrating climate change adaptation and development (Tanner and Allouche 2011). International policy
guidelines largely assume vulnerability to be determined
by biophysical change and marginalization (Nightingale
2017), and adaptation to be policy interventions decreasing risk or deriving benefits from these changes (Klein et
al. 2007; Smit and Pilifosova 2001). The political ecology
tradition, however, shows that biophysical change is
always mediated through a variety of social and political mechanisms (Forsyth 2014; Ribot 1995; Taylor 2015;
Nightingale 2017). It emphasizes how vulnerabilities are
built upon power differentials of class, gender, caste, and
HIMALAYA Volume 39, Number 2 | 5

ethnicity (Mosse 2007). Anthropology, on the other hand,
refers adaptation to changes in belief and/or behavior in
response to changing circumstances (Oliver-Smith 2016).
People do not just adapt to natural features, but also to human institutions, including all climate change governance
mechanisms to be established (Birkmann 2011). Many
ethnographies on climate change demonstrate that, along
with climate change, communities worldwide are undergoing changing cultural, social, and material lives following capitalist globalization and environmental change
(Rudiak-Gould 2013; Connell 2015; Crate and Nuttall 2016;
Jacka 2016). Thus, adaptation should be conceptualized as a
social-political process that mediates how individuals and
collectives address multiple types of simultaneously occurring changes (Eriksen, Nightingale, and Eakin 2015).
Using the frameworks above as my reference, I follow
Tonkiss’s (2012) guidelines in doing discourse analysis. My
purpose is not to describe in detail the selected documents,
but to understand how the country of Nepal, as well as
the terms ‘vulnerability’ and ‘adaptation’ are constructed
in them. I review shorter documents thoroughly and use
an open-source, text analysis tool (voyant-tools.org) for
longer documents to search and analyze Nepal’s positioning in the document, and each context under which the
terms ‘climate change’, ‘vulnerability’, and ‘adaptation’ are
being used. Many of these contexts are simply names of
institutions and policies. After taking away those, I identify
recurring key themes in the rest and classify them under
‘responsibility’, ‘vulnerability’, and ‘transition’ for the first
part of my analysis; and ‘apolitical, technical’, ‘political
ecology’ or ‘anthropological’ perspectives for the second
part (see Figures 1 and 2). These help me to see which
perspectives are being emphasized and which perspectives
are absent. I will discuss each of these themes in my analysis, drawing quotations from the documents as examples.

For some themes (such as participatory process and local
knowledge, see Figure 2), it is not immediately evident to
which category it belongs. My analysis will provide a closer
look at the sentences and contexts to determine their
underlying discourses.
Documents Selection
I focus on seven climate change related documents by
the country for critical analysis (See Table 1). As previously mentioned, Nepal, in a brief submitted to UNFCCC,
has listed seventeen climate change related policies and
instruments. As my focus is on climate change policy
discourses, particularly how vulnerability and adaptation
are represented, I select those which are explicitly focusing on climate change strategies. I eliminate those with
a broader focus (e.g. Sustainable Development Agenda of
Nepal, Thirteenth Plan), those with a narrower, sectoral
focus (e.g. Agricultural Development Strategy, Forest
Policy, etc.), and those addressing merely the ‘status’
of climate change (e.g. Climate change: status paper for
COP15, Status of Climate Change in Nepal). I also include
Climate Resilient Planning, which is not in that list, but
seems rather important in guiding the integration of
climatic risks in Nepal’s development plans and programs.
These choices might be subjected to some limitations. For
instance, as my research does not involve any fieldwork
with policy makers, I am unable to select documents based
on how and why they are produced, though I am aware
that many of them are produced in response to international climate regime (e.g. Climate Change Policy 2011,
NAPA and LAPA) (Helvetas and RRI 2011). Nonetheless,
as my analysis shows, these selected documents have
served my purpose of providing insights into Nepal’s own
positioning and how ‘vulnerability’ and ‘adaptation’ are
constructed in the official policy discourses.

Figure 1. Part 1 of my
analysis identifes and
classifes recurring themes
in policy discourses under
vulnerability, transition or
responsibility.
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Figure 2. Part 2 of my
analysis identifes
and classifes
recurring themes in
policy discourses
under ‘technical’,
‘political ecology’
and ‘anthropological’
perspectives.

Results and Analysis:
Part 1: Vulnerability and Transition Discourses
A strong vulnerability discourse is evident in Nepal climate-change documents examined. For instance, in the
CCP, a statement reads: “Despite having only 0.4 percent
of the total global population and being responsible for
only 0.025 percent of total greenhouse gas emissions in the
world, Nepal will be affected disproportionately, especially
from increasing atmospheric temperature” (GoN 2011b: 3).
The document does not delve into the question on who are
indeed responsible for climate change but rather focuses
on how Nepal is affected disproportionately. By juxtaposing Nepal’s lack of responsibility in causing climate change
and the impacts suffered by it, the policy discourses actively establish and present an image of Nepal as a vulnerable
victim for its international audience. Such vulnerability
discourses are occasionally presented in conjunction with
a weak responsibility discourse. The latter is usually to
endorse an existing idea of receiving compensation from
historically greenhouse gases emitting countries, rather
than an overt criticizing of them or the status quo. For
example, in the Kalapathar document, the fifth declaration
is to “obtain support of the world community to effectively
implement projects in accordance with Nepal’s needs...
Also endorse the proposal requiring developed nations to
contribute at least 1.5 percent of their GDP to the Climate
Change Fund” (GoN 2009: 2). The tenth declaration reads
“Call to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases...draw attention of everyone to obtain compensation from the countries emitting greenhouse gases, and relief for poor nations
and people adversely affected” (ibid).

The language of vulnerability can be viewed as a necessary
tool or justification to advocate for financial and technical support by the international climate change regime.
After all, Nepal has been highly reliant on international
development aid for the pass decades. The GoN makes such
intention clear through multiple statements. For example, one of the objectives of policies stated in the CCP is
“To improve the living standard of people by maximum
utilization of the opportunities created from the climate
change-related conventions, protocols and agreements”
(GoN 2011a: 6). In the NAPA document, a paragraph reads
“the NAPA prioritization process serves as a basis for the
development of an adaptation strategy that will be able to
draw financial resources for implementation from national
as well as various global, multilateral and bilateral sources” (GoN 2011b: xi). The same document expresses Nepal’s
expectation for additional funding in addition to existing
international aid commitment, as such cost was not factored in when the commitments were made. Such expectation also aligns with the interests of development agencies
supporting the making of these documents, as they rely
on funding allocation to the country to demonstrate their
relevance and sustain their offices.
Another strong, consistent discourse apparent throughout
the documents is the transition discourse. Transition into
low-carbon development or growth is well embraced by
the Nepali government and appears consistently in every
major document. “Low carbon development and climate
resilience” (GoN 2011b: 6) is explicitly listed as a set of
policies to be devised in the CCP, along with “Technology
development, transfer and utilization” (ibid: 8).
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Document

Abbreviation

Year

Kalapathar Declaration

-

2009

Declaration on collective commitments on
climate change and areas of cooperation

Climate Resilient Planning

CRP

2011

Integration of climatic risks in development
plans and programs to ensure the sustainability of development interventions

National Climate
Change Policy

CCP

2011

Enlisting overall adaptation and mitigation
policies and goals in Nepal

National Adaptation
Plans of Action to Climate Change

NAPA

2010

Documenting the NAPA preparation processes, methods, and criteria for prioritizing
interventions, key adaptation needs, and
priority adaptation actions

Nepal Climate Change
Support Program

NCCSP

2012

Providing contexts, strategy, framework for
management, and monitoring and evaluation to ensure that the poorest and most
vulnerable in Nepal are able to adapt to
climate change

National Framework on
Local Adaptation Plans
for Action

LAPA

2011

Providing principles and stepwise guidance
for local adaptation framework

Nepal Second National
Communication
to UNFCCC

SNC

2014

A comprehensive national-level report on
climate change including national status,
mitigation and vulnerability assessment,
adaptation measures, gaps, etc.
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Objective/Content

Table 1. Details
of selected
climate
change policy
documents.

This coincides with the Three-Year Development Plan
2010/11-2013/14 of the country, with the objectives of
green development and making development activities climate-friendly and resilient. Such moves align closely with
Nepal’s self-interest as a mountainous landlocked country
heavily dependent on neighboring India in fossil fuel energy supply. As mentioned in the CRP document:
...it [Nepal] must reduce its dependency on unsustainable and expensive fossil fuel, which costs
Nepal a significant share of its revenue, and seek
self-reliance by promoting renewable sources of
energy for fuel-sustainable development” (GoN
2011a: 27). This foresight is proven relevant with
the nine-month blockade of imports from India in
post-earthquake Nepal in Winter 2015 that caused a
country-wide fuel crisis, adding to the pain of already suffering earthquake victims (Pattison 2015).
Accompanying these vulnerability and transition discourses, then, is a strong advocacy for technology transfer and
potential climate finance mechanisms. In the Kalapathar
Declaration, a paragraph reads:
With the confidence that by developing clean energy, we can reduce carbon emission in the region,
draw attention of developed and neighboring
countries for the appropriate, modern technology,
its easily accessible transfer and investment (GoN
2009: 2).
Another important agenda outlined in the CCP is to take
advantage and “mobilize additional technical and financial
resources from clean and renewable energy development,
carbon trade and other mechanisms related to reducing
the impacts of climate change.”(GoN 2011b: 4) Related policies include “Generating financial resources by promoting
carbon trade and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)”,
and “Generating financial resources through the implementation of the “polluter pays principle” and the payment for environmental services concept” (GoN 2011b: 7).
Market instruments such as CDM or REDD+ are consistently
mentioned in national level policy documents.
The GoN shows a notable amount of agency through their
climate change discourses. As discussed by Mathews (2015)
on the roles of the Mexican government in the REDD
and REDD+ program as an international broker, similar
roles are being taken by the GoN, by presenting the good
candidacy of Nepal as a funding recipient. For instance,
the NCCSP document, a project supported by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), compliments
Nepal for actively taking part in global negotiations and
constantly raising the issues of climate change impacts

on mountainous countries and LDCs. The GoN itself often
mentions their own efforts in fulfilling international commitments. For instance, ‘commitment’ to various global
initiatives by the GoN is mentioned in both the CRP and
the CCP documents. Nepal also builds its good candidacy
through its adherence to the ‘transition’ and ‘vulnerability’
discourses—consensus discourses embraced by the European Union as well as the developing countries.
However, the official discourses lack the perspectives of
a strong responsibility discourse or a justice discourse of
the global environmental justice movements. The word
‘justice’ was only mentioned once in the CCP in terms
of ‘climate justice’ as part of the vision, with no further
explanation and elaboration in the rest of the document,
and once in the NCCSP document, as an elaboration of the
importance of participatory approach. This deemphasis
curiously manifests a disconnect with Nepal’s internal
politics. Internally, the country has undergone a ten-year
armed conflict between the Communist Party of Nepal
(Maoist) (CPN-M) and the GoN, which ended a mere few
years prior to these documents. The war radically shaped a
new political awareness on social and redistributive justice
(Shneiderman 2009; Ojha et al. 2016; Nightingale 2017).
Externally, however, the GoN has been highly reliant on
international aid in the past decades, and thus demonstrates a very pragmatic and externally oriented positioning. There is no demonstration of strong, specific advocacy
for those responsible to reduce GHG emission. Instead,
in the NAPA document, the statement: “Increased rate of
greenhouse gas emissions in spite of substantial reduction
commitment from developed countries” (GoN 2010b: i)
seems to create an impression that the developed countries have indeed tried their best. There is also no agency
shown in acquiring the language of global environmental
justice movement to formulate a transformative development pathway against the international status quo.
These discourses used by Nepal, along with information
from existing literature, provide some clues on the contexts of climate change policy processes in Nepal. From
the perspective of developing states like Nepal, the main
concerns during international climate change negotiations, are the possible restrictions imposed on their
development efforts, and on securing additional funding
and resources. Countries of ‘high vulnerability’, such as the
Least-Developing Countries and the Small Island States,
group themselves to highlight their needs for support in
terms of adaptation and mitigation finance, technology
transfer, and compensation of loss and damage in face of
climate change (Tanner and Allouche 2011). The Nepali
state has been in transition after the 1996-2006 Maoist Civil
War and highly reliant on external donors and civil society
HIMALAYA Volume 39, Number 2 | 9

to fulfill its functions. Climate change policies such as the
CCP, NAPA, and LAPA are prepared in direct response to
international climate regime to which Nepal is also a signatory party, to ensure eligibility for funding from UNFCCC
(Helvetas and RRI 2011). With international donors as
the specific audience in mind, Nepal did little beyond the
global guidelines and depended heavily on scientific and
technological definitions of climate change vulnerabilities
and solutions (Ojha et al. 2016). Donors and development
agencies play decisive roles in these policy processes. For
instance, the NAPA development process involved two
senior governmental officials and three donor representatives in its project executive board. Though multiple
consultations are supposedly involved, the entire process
was in English and thus excluding those who do not have
proficiencies (Ojha et al. 2016). As a result, western and
technocratic views of climate change are prioritized over
local perspectives and realities. This will be evident in Part
2 of my analysis.
Part 2a: ‘Vulnerability’ in the Nepali Policy Discourses
In all Nepali policy documents, the concept of ‘vulnerability’ has been used extensively in conjunction with climate
change adaptation. In most contexts, the word ‘vulnerability’ refers to susceptibility towards climate change impacts.
The vulnerable populations are typically defined by sectors
and geographic areas. For instance, in the NAPA document, the mid- and far-western mountains and hills and
six key sectors (i.e. agriculture and food security, water
resources and energy, climate-induced disasters, forests
and biodiversity, public health and urban settlement, and
infrastructure) are identified as vulnerable. Vulnerability
is assessed at the district level by overlaying climate risk/
exposure maps, sensitivity maps (defined by sectors and
livelihood), and adaptive capacity maps (defined by human
development index and food security status) following
the vulnerability assessment framework of the IPCC. Such
assessment projects a static and unitary understanding
of vulnerability, rather than a dynamic process resulting
from social interaction and power relations.
Yet, previous studies on community forestry in Nepal, for
instance, found that power structures affect local dynamic in natural resource management, and that the poor are
usually disadvantaged in the decision-making processes
(Acharya 2002; Adhikari, Di Falco, and Lovett 2004; Thoms
2008). As climate change adaptation is about access and
control of natural resources for natural resource-dependent communities, these existing power differentials
matter. Vulnerabilities are not static and unitary properties of communities, but an expression of complex
socio-ecological relations (Taylor 2015). Work by Pasang
10 | HIMALAYA Fall 2019

Sherpa (2014) in Pharak, Nepal, for instance, also shows
that while some people are saturated with information
on climate change, others are not at all. Hence, social
heterogeneity and social networks play a role in climate
change adaptation.
Such awareness of social heterogeneity within communities is not entirely absent in the policy discourses. The
NAPA document recognizes that the degree of vulnerability within the low scored districts may be high due to the
disparity among the population. It thus calls for vulnerability assessment at the Village Development Committees
level. However, this suggestion only shifts the unitary
and static understanding to a smaller scale. Moreover, the
GoN chose pilot districts for LAPA based on vulnerability
depicted by NAPA Vulnerability Map (GoN 2010a), pre-excluding low-vulnerability districts, along with its differential vulnerable populations from pilot initiatives. Some
documents also attempt to highlight how poor people are
particularly vulnerable to climate change and recognize
the socio-cultural diversity in the country. The NAPA (GoN
2011b: 2), citing Pradhan and Shrestha (2005), reads:
Although intermingling between the various
groups has occurred, they differ widely in the
details of cultures and adaptations... resettlement
of the hill and mountain people into the Terai since
the 1960 ...resulting in an extremely heterogeneous and complex Terai population.” The NCCSP
document further acknowledges that “an unclear/
generalized definition of vulnerability has led to
the dilution of gender and social inclusion issues
(GoN 2012: 22).
Curiously, the documents explicitly mention a relation between power and vulnerability only when it comes to women. For instance, the NAPA document acknowledges that
women are more vulnerable than men in face of climate
change. Its annex enlists twenty-four ways that women
are disproportionately impacted by climate change in six
different sectors. Section 4.12 of the SNC is dedicated to
gender and social inclusion: “Power relations arise between
the sexes, caste and gender roles in livelihood generation...
women have less influence in decision making, less secure
resource rights and are more likely to experience poverty”
(GoN 2014: 134). The same section further elaborates that
“climate change, may in fact, worsen gender inequalities by
creating extra work for women, and aggravating their vulnerability in poor and socially excluded household” (ibid).
The NAPA also mentions indigenous groups, namely the
Majhi, Rautes, Chepang, and Satar, as disproportionately
vulnerable, not due to power, but due to livelihood sectors
they are typically involved in. Dalit, another marginalized

groups in the caste system, are very briefly mentioned once
in three documents, without explanation of how they are
especially vulnerable.
The emphasis on women is unsurprising. Gender equality
has always been an important agenda by multilateral institutions such as the United Nations in Nepal (UNCT Nepal
2007; 2012; 2017). Indigenous peoples are also getting attention due to international recognition as well as Nepal’s
own political context.2 In comparison, dalit, as a regional
and ethnically linked minority issue, is less prominent to
donors and policy makers, even when there are various
ongoing ethnic movements in the country (Lawoti and
Hangen 2013; Upadhyay 2013).
In short, the Nepali discourses align with the apolitical,
technical perspective in identifying vulnerable sectors and
geographic areas. Some understandings of vulnerabilities
based on power relations can be traced in the examined
documents, but not explicitly, and with little effects on
how climate change adaptation measures are planned or
implemented. Apart from gender relations, there are no
frameworks explaining how the complex social and power
relations in highly heterogeneous and stratified societies
of Nepal could result in different vulnerabilities in face of
climate change.
Part 2b: ‘Adaptation’ in the Nepali Policy Discourses
The CCP summarizes Nepal’s climate change adaptation strategy in one of its goals—“adoption of effective
measures to address adverse impacts of climate change
through technology development and transfer, public
awareness raising, capacity building and access to financial resources” (GoN 2011a: 5). Such a discourse approximates the dominant, international approach to adaptation
as a technical and financial matter.3 All the 250 adaptation
options documented in the NAPA are seemingly concrete, straight-forward actions given required resources.
The NAPA and CRP documents rightly mention adaptive
capacity as access to services, information, technology,
finance, livelihood options, etc. Yet, there is a lack of
engagement in the text on addressing the possible factors
behind differential access.
Languages in selected documents often frame adaptation
as skills/activities transmitted from external actors rather
than a long-term socio-political process involving belief
and behavior change in the locales. This concurs with
the perspectives of donors, who often must justify their
interventions based on the expertise they can bring to their
beneficiaries. Examples of indicators of adaptation activities as outlined by the NCCSP document are: “14,300 vul-

nerable men and 21,450 most vulnerable women received
training on climate change” and “18,000 climate vulnerable
poor people benefitted from adaptation services” (GoN and
UNDP 2012: 38). The focus is on people who gain access to
these trainings or services, not on those who were left out.
The importance of understanding behavioral change is only
briefly recognized in the LAPA framework. Socio-political
aspects, such as ensuring equity of access, social, and cultural acceptance, addressing existing or potential resource
conflicts, potential to use local knowledge and technology,
etc., do not constitute adaptation strategies themselves, but
are limited as criteria for prioritizing adaptation actions in
the NAPA document.
Climate change adaptation policy in Nepal also focuses on
the development of new institutions4 or restructuring of
existing ones, but not whether marginalized groups could
easily adapt to their working, and whether they could
themselves constitute the problem of inaccessibility to
services and vulnerabilities of people. This is, again, a manifestation of the technocratic approach underlying most
development interventions that ignores local disparities in
stratified societies. A study by Tiwari et al. (2014) found existing mechanisms, institutional arrangement, and capacity
of the service provider government institutions questionable in achieving goals and objectives of the CCP. The language of people-centric, participatory, inclusive, bottom-up
planning masks these institutional gaps in implementation.
Instead of employing a framework of ‘justice’, the policies
use the language of ‘inclusion’ and ‘participation’—long
applied keywords in the field of international development—which create consent without challenging existing
power relations. A participatory approach is claimed in the
preparation of three different documents.5 For instance,
the NCCSP document reads: “representation of dalit, ethnic
groups and minorities will be ensured in various committees at the village level and in all cases at least 50% of them”
(UNDP and GoN 2012: 28). The CCP lists: “Capacity building,
people’s participation and empowerment” (GoN 2011b:
7) as a set of policies, among which include “Ensuring the
participation of poor people, dalit, marginalized indigenous
communities, women, children and youth in the implementation of climate adaptation and climate change-related
programs.” In multiple documents,6 it is stated that 80% of
the climate change adaptation fund should be delegated to
the local level, even though there is no clear statement on
who should make decision about its allocation (Helvetas
and RRI 2011).
There is a broad acceptance within anthropology that
populations around the world possess intimate knowledge
about their surrounding environment, allowing them to
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utilize their resources for social reproduction and physical
sustenance (Fiske et al. 2014). While local knowledge has
also been emphasized in the Nepali documents, the understanding of the importance of local knowledge seems to lie
on its utility and transferability, rather than as the means
to understand the deeper socio-cultural beliefs and institutions at the local level for better adaptation strategy. For
instance, the CCP states as one of its policies: “Collecting,
publishing, disseminating and utilizing climate adaptation
and adverse impact mitigation-related traditional and local
knowledge, skills, practices, and technologies” (GoN 2011b:
8); and the NAPA calls to integrate technical data with local
knowledge related to understand vulnerability and coping
strategies. A number of other documents show the recurring themes of local knowledge.7
In many localities, there are pre-existing stressors, such as
water, health, and food security issues (Barnes 2015; Lynn
et al. 2014; Nading 2014), which might or might not be exacerbated by climate change. For instance, the Annex 4 in the
NAPA enlisting local perceptions of climate change impact
also highlights socio-cultural issues such as increased
mental stress and workload, urban migration, conflict over
natural resources, etc. In Nepal, both food insecurity and
flood have long plagued the country’s population in some
districts. The district of Humla has been the target of food
security interventions for decades (Adhikari 2008), before
its identification as a district vulnerable to climate change
(GoN 2010a). Focusing solely on effects of climate change
fails to address systemically imposed social vulnerability
(Fiske et al. 2014). In fact, people may be adapting more
to (and thus reinforcing) systemic vulnerability than to
climate change itself. Mathur (2015), through a case study
of the Indian Himalayas, demonstrates that climate change
could be potentially used to distract wider, pre-existing
structural problems such as negligence of a segment of its
population. In Nepal, a strong coupling of natural disasters
and climate change in the national discourses potentially
masks government incompetence in managing long-existing social and structural factors of disasters.
Discourses in the examined documents also make a direct
assumption of the compatibility between climate change
adaptation and national development framework. References to the major national development agenda, which is
poverty reduction through sustainable economic growth,
are evident in most documents including the NAPA, the
SNC, and the NCCSP documents as the guiding framework
for adaptation policies. While it is true that climate change
could undermine development efforts, some development
work can exacerbate people’s vulnerabilities to climate
change. Cannon and Muller-Mahn (2010: 624) posed the
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question: “do development processes lead to a parallel
process of adaptation to climate change, or are they a part
of the problem?” Many development projects have been
shown to increase people’s risk to hazard (Wisner et al.
2004; UNDP 2004). Failure to address such question shows
the lack of consideration and comprehension of the drivers
of vulnerabilities.
Overall, climate change adaptation in these documents is
a technical and financial matter, and series of actions to
be conducted, rather than changes in the existing system.
‘Local participation’, ‘inclusion’, and ‘bottom-up’, popular terms appealing to development partners, are heavily
applied. Local knowledge is emphasized, not as a primary
vehicle towards formulating contextualized strategy, but
as an additional tool/knowledge emphasized in the technocratic tradition. While traces of socio-cultural dimensions could be found in these documents, they do not seem
to constitute the major framework or influence adaptation
measures systematically.
Conclusion
The first part of my analysis shows that the Nepali policy makers and donors have actively projected Nepal as a
vulnerable but cooperative country, which is eligible for
climate change funding and support for transition to new
technology. There are a relatively lack of ‘responsibility’ or ‘justice’ discourses that seek to achieve equity and
transform the status quo. Due to the current international
structure and the logic of aid economy, policy makers
view the concern on climate change as the opportunity to
procure more resources for the development of the country, and avoid overtly criticizing their donors or altering
international frameworks. From the international donors’
perspective, Nepal has done a remarkable job in fulfilling
their expectations, with its LAPA being globally praised for
its emphasis on consultative, bottom-up approach (Ayers
and Forsyth 2009; Nightingale 2017). This mutual interest
of both donors and Nepal as an aid recipient, has impeded
imaginaries of Nepali policy makers to pursue alternatives
involving radical but necessary socio-political and cultural
change as effective adaptation measures for all.
The second part of my analysis shows that climate change
policies and documents in Nepal project a heavily technocratic approach with little socio-cultural considerations.
Whenever traced, the social, political, and cultural dimensions do not seem to have markedly affected the major
framework. This shows that policy makers are not completely unaware of local realities, but these understandings
have not been used to systematically challenge the inter-

national guidelines and framework in addressing climate
change. From the political ecology perspective, Nepal’s
NAPA and LAPA, consistently address “outcome vulnerability” at the expense of “contextual vulnerability” (Nagoda 2015: 570), and do not consider structural causes and
power-relations in the highly stratified society. From the
anthropological perspective, the official climate change
discourses in Nepal fail to understand adaptation as a longterm change in people’s belief system and behavior, rather
than project activities to be conducted and check listed.
As there have not been any recognition and discussion on
systemic ills and institutional obstacles for marginalized
groups, climate change discourses in Nepal are at risk of
perpetuating problems in the existing system and worsen
vulnerabilities of its population in the long run.

As the country is transitioning into a decentralized, federal
system, there could be new opportunities at the provincial
and municipal level. Lessons about the shortcomings of
the current policies could be useful for community actors,
researchers or policy makers who will work at the
sub-national level in the future. At the local level, actors
could be free from international aid politics, and directly
engage each other for a more contextualized understanding of local vulnerability and possible long-term adaptation strategy. However, such engagement must build on an
understanding of the existing discourses and their criticisms. This is where I hope this paper can contribute.

Both parts of my analysis, when viewed together, show
that Nepal’s positioning in the international arena affects
its policy discourses. The policy-makers’ intention to paint
the picture of Nepal as an ideal funding recipient to international donors, could reasonably explain why western
and technical perspectives dominate those discourses.
However, Nepal has been dependent on development aid
for decades without evident success. Some have characterized Nepal’s development as failing and harmful (Shrestha
1997; Pandey 1999). Viewed from this perspective, the
global crisis of climate change could have been an opportunity for the Nepali state to learn how development in industrialized countries has incurred enormous costs on the
rest of the humanity. Nepali policy makers and civil society
for that matter,8 could have taken this crisis as a premise
to push for autonomy in paving a different, self-reliant
pathway—one that connects climate change issues with
the internal political struggles for social inclusion. As
Nightingale (2017: 15) argues, “climate change in Nepal
could be framed in terms other than ‘vulnerable’ which
could lead to alternative priorities and imaginations.”
Nepal’s geography and recent changes offer a wealth of
contextualized knowledge and experience to illuminate its
own path forward. Ecologically, the diverse ecological contexts in Nepal means that its population has been adapting to some of the harshest environment for centuries,
including recurring floods, landslides, glacier outbursts,
and the recent 2015 earthquake. Institutionally, Nepal has
experienced a decade of Maoist Civil War, a transition from
monarchy to federalism, followed by substantial social and
political changes. These experiences, if wisely used and reflected upon, could spell out a very different policy future
than an internationally driven one.
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Endnotes
1. The brief can be accessed from the UNFCCC portal at
<https://unfccc.int>. The complete list of climate change
related documents include Sustainable Development
Agenda of Nepal (SDAN), 2003; Initial National
Communication, 2004; Everest Declaration (Kalapathar
Cabinet Meeting), 2009; Climate change: status paper for
COP15; National Adaptation Program of Action to Climate
Change, 2010; Climate Change Vulnerability Mapping
in Nepal, 2010; Climate Change Policy, 2011; National
Framework on Local Adaptation Plans for Action, 2011;
Status of Climate Change in Nepal, 2011; Low Carbon
and Economic Development Strategy (LCEDS) draft;
Environment Friendly Local Government Framework,
2013 (EFLG); Agriculture Development Strategy, 2015;
Thirteenth Plan (TP) (2013/14-2015/16); Nepal Biodiversity
Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP), 2014; Forest Policy,
2015; Second National Communication, 2015, Technology
Needs Assessment, 2015.
2. Nepal has adopted the United Nation Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and ratified the
Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the
International Labour Organization (ILO, Convention no
169). During Nepal’s transition to a federal system after
the Maoist civil war, various ethnic and indigenous groups
have exerted significant influence in the constitutiondrafting process.
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3. In many cases, climate change adaptation in Nepal is
about Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) pertaining to Glacial
Lake Outburst Flood (GLOF), flood, and landslides. DRR has
been considered as a climate change adaptation strategy in
the CCP, SNC, and CRP reports.
4. Examples include new national-level mechanisms such
as the Climate Change Council and the Multi Stakeholder
Initiative Coordination Committee (MCCICC) for coordination
in planning, the Climate Change and Development online
portal to facilitate knowledge exchange, and the Climate
Change Division and the Program Monitoring and Evaluation
Unit within the Ministry of Education to support climate
change policies implementation.
5. The NAPA framework uses a participatory approach in
vulnerability mapping. The LAPA framework also claims
an inclusive approach, involving those most risk to climate
change, economically poor, deprived of public services and
socially disadvantaged.
6. NAPA, LAPA, NCCSP, and CCP.
7. Examples include the LAPA Framework which claims
a bottom-up approach that considers local resources such
as knowledge, skill and practices in the planning process.
An entire section 5.2 of the SNC report is dedicated in
explaining existing indigenous knowledge related to
climate risk, ongoing studies and documentation, as well
as reasons for integrating indigenous knowledge in climate
change adaptation policy.
8. There have been no major concerns or public
contestation in Nepal regarding climate change, even
when hot debates emerged around other policies such
as the Forest Act and Agricultural Development Strategy
(Ojha et al. 2016).
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